← All papers
Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, Emmanuel Saez · State of the States: The Poverty and Inequality Report, Pathways Magazine (Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality), Special Issue 2015, pp. 55-60
Economic Mobility
14 problems found: 1 major · 4 moderate · 9 minor
What the paper claims
- US intergenerational mobility is lower than is often appreciated: the national rank-rank relationship is almost perfectly linear with a slope of 0.34, and US mobility is significantly lower than in most other developed countries.
- Rank-based mobility is not declining: it 'remained extremely stable for the 1971-1993 birth cohorts', and 'if anything, mobility may have increased slightly in recent cohorts'.
- Combined with PSID evidence that mobility did not change significantly between the 1950 and 1970 birth cohorts, rank-based mobility 'remained stable over the second half of the 20th century'.
- Mobility varies substantially within the US, by region, state, commuting zone and city; the best areas exceed most developed countries and the worst are below any developed country with data.
- Upward mobility is lower in areas with more racial and income segregation, sprawl and income inequality (Gini, but not top-1% shares), and higher in areas with better schools, higher local tax rates, more social capital and stronger family structure (the strongest predictor); the correlations are not causal.
- Because inequality rose while rank mobility stayed stable, the 'birth lottery' matters more; the Great Gatsby puzzle is explained by inequality growth concentrated in the top 1%, which is not strongly associated with mobility across countries or metro areas.
Every problem found
1majorlikely · previously known · external inconsistency
The chapter says poor children's chances of moving up stayed the same, or even improved slightly, for children born between 1971 and 1993. Newer and much larger data, from a team led by the chapter's own lead author, show that for children born between 1978 and 1992 the link between parents' and children's incomes actually got about a tenth stronger. That is a modest fall in mobility, not stability. The forecasts the chapter relied on for the youngest children pointed the wrong way, although the change is still small compared with the differences between places.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. CDGPY's population estimates put the pooled rank-rank slope at 0.286 rising to 0.313 (age 27, 1978-92; +0.0022/yr) and at 0.320 rising to 0.355 (ages 29-30, 1980-86; +0.0034/yr over 1978-89). The chapter's source estimated -0.0006/yr with a 95% upper bound of +0.0008/yr ('at most 0.27 percent per year'). Substituting anchored measured changes for the AER P&P forecasts turns the 1971-1989/92 trend into +0.0020 to +0.0029/yr, with CIs excluding zero. Persistence therefore rose by roughly 0.03 (about 10% of its level), opposite in sign to the 'if anything increased' inference from college-attendance gradients. The rise is modest relative to geographic dispersion. Its exact size is uncertain because the AER P&P population series at age 26 fell over 1980-86.
Evidence. (1) The adjudicator recovered the plotted values of CDGPY Appendix Figure A.3 (p. 100) exactly from the PDF vector paths (scripts/extract_figA3_vector.py). The five navy SOI points match AER P&P App. Table 1 col. 5 to within 0.0004, which validates the calibration. Pooled rank-rank slopes: household income at 27, 0.286 (1978), 0.287 (1980), 0.303 (1986), 0.313 (1992); at ages 29-30, 0.326 (1978), 0.320 (1980), 0.355 (1986), 0.352 (1989). (2) OLS trends are +0.0022/yr (age 27, 1978-92) and +0.0034/yr (ages 29-30, 1978-89). The chapter's source reports a trend of -0.0006/yr with 95% upper bound 0.0008 (reproduced: -0.00057, CI [-0.00194, +0.00080]). (3) In the CDGPY public national Table 5 CSV, the pooled p75-p25 gap in child rank at 27 rises from 13.04 to 14.67 percentiles (+12.5%, 1978-92), and the mean rank of children from p25 families falls from 44.96 to 43.45 (scripts/cdgpy_national.py). (4) Replacing the AER P&P forecasts for 1983-89/92 with these measured changes, anchored to the 1980-82 SOI level, gives trends of +0.0020 to +0.0029/yr with 95% CIs excluding zero. The 1989 forecast (0.294) lies about 0.036 below the anchored measured value (0.330), and the 1992 forecast (0.281) about 0.05 below (scripts/trend_with_later_data.py). (5) Within-race bottom-to-top probabilities, 1978 to 1992 (CDGPY Tables A.9-A.11): white 13.7% to 11.9%, Hispanic 9.4% to 8.9%, Black 3.0% to 3.0%. (6) The college gradient behind the 1987-93 forecast fell (0.751 to 0.692; AER App. Table 1 col. 8). Over the same cohorts the measured income slope kept rising (0.305 to 0.313, 1987-92), and the white class gap in four-year graduation by 27 widened from 21.4 to 29.5 points (CDGPY Table A.3). (7) Caveat: the AER P&P's own measured population-sample slope at age 26 fell from 0.2735 to 0.2648 over 1980-86 (-0.0026/yr, SE 0.0008), whereas CDGPY's age-27 slope rose from 0.287 to 0.303. CDGPY do not reconcile the two. Their sample links children to parents from 1994 and measures parent income at ages 13-17; the AER P&P population sample links only from 1996 and covers 85.6% of the 1980 cohort versus 97.2% of the 1986 cohort.
Why this severity. Changes the chapter's headline trend from 'extremely stable / not declining / if anything improving' to a modest but precisely estimated rise in persistence (about +0.03, a trend 3-4 times the published upper bound). The qualitative claim is reversed in sign, though not by a large amount. Not critical: the rise is only about 0.4-0.6 of the cross-CZ SD of rank-rank slopes (0.056-0.065); it concerns only cohorts born after 1978; the conflict with the source's own measured age-26 series is unexplained; and the geography is untouched.
The authors' response. The lead author's later paper (CDGPY, Sec. II.C) acknowledges the upward trend and attributes its non-detection to SOI sampling error. It does not discuss the AER P&P population age-26 series. No statement by Hendren, Kline or Saez was located.
2moderateconfirmed · newly identified here · speculative assumption
For children born after 1982, the chapter's 'no change' evidence is not measured adult income. It is a forecast built from incomes at younger ages and from college enrolment, assuming these always move in step with adult income. Using only the years actually measured, the data are too noisy to rule out a sizeable rise in how much parents' income matters. The text also understates how many years were forecasts.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. Eleven of the 23 trend points (1983-93) are proxies rescaled by constants fitted on the 1980-86 overlaps, and they enter the OLS as error-free observations. Only these points pin the CI down to 0.0008/yr. Measured age-29-30 data alone cannot exclude a rise of about 2.5% a year (upper bound +0.0075/yr), and dropping only the college-based points gives an upper bound of +0.0034/yr, four times the published one. The downward slope of the forecast segment comes from the college gradient's fall over the 1990-93 cohorts (0.732 to 0.692), a relation the authors themselves found had failed in an earlier period.
Evidence. Adjudicator reproduction from app_tables.xls (scripts/reproduce_pathways.py). (1) The consolidated series rebuilds from its components (max diff 6.9e-8; factors 1.117784 and 0.394790). Its trend is -0.000573/yr (SE 0.000658), 95% CI [-0.00194, +0.00080]. (2) Measured SOI ages 29-30 only, 1971-82: +0.00244/yr (SE 0.00227), 95% CI [-0.0026, +0.0075]. (3) Consolidated 1971-86 without the college-based points: +0.00061 (SE 0.00131), upper bound +0.0034. (4) Measured population age-26 slopes, 1980-86: -0.00263 (SE 0.00079). (5) Codex's illustrative scenarios raise the college conversion factor by 10% or 20% by 1993; the trend becomes +0.0004 or +0.0014. (6) Unquantified extra caveat: 1098-T forms miss some no-tuition low-income students. Only 87.1% of bottom-quintile college attendees appear in 1098-T records (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner & Yagan 2020, Online Appendix fn. 7), so the gradient level is overstated, and any change in non-filing over 2003-12 would contaminate its trend.
Why this severity. Concerns the basis and precision of a core trend claim rather than an arithmetic error, and the assumption is disclosed in the figure note and the source. Its realised consequence (the forecasts missed a rise in persistence) is graded in F1, so this is kept at moderate to avoid double counting.
The authors' response. AER P&P p. 145 states the assumption. NBER WP 19844 fn. 9: 'The validity of this assumption should be evaluated as data for more cohorts become available.' The Figure 2 note labels the open circles as forecasts.
3moderateconfirmed · newly identified here · overclaiming
The chapter's list of traits of high-mobility places treats every area equally, so hundreds of small rural areas count as much as big cities. Counted by how many people live there, most of these links are about half as strong. Several are no longer clearly present: income segregation, overall inequality, test scores, class size, local taxes and marriage rates. Family structure and race remain strongly linked to mobility.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. Unweighted CZ correlations are dominated by small, mostly rural CZs (331 of the 709 have fewer than 100,000 residents and together hold 5% of the population). Weighting by 2000 population, the estimand relevant to the typical child, roughly halves most associations. With state-clustered SEs, the following have |t| < 2: income segregation (t about 1.6), Gini (1.5), test scores (0.8), student-teacher ratio (+0.4, wrong sign), local tax rate (1.7) and fraction married (1.7). The correlates that remain robust are the single-parent share (-0.61), fraction Black (-0.62), dropout rate (-0.43), religiosity (0.41), the commute share (0.34), racial segregation (-0.31) and social capital (0.30).
Evidence. The adjudicator reproduced the unweighted and population-weighted point estimates exactly from ODT V and VIII (scripts/reproduce_pathways.py). State-clustered SEs are taken from QJE Online App. Table VIII. Unweighted to population-weighted (SE): income segregation -0.393 to -0.169 (0.105); racial segregation -0.361 to -0.311 (0.092); commute under 15 min 0.605 to 0.335 (0.115); Gini -0.578 to -0.236 (0.162); test scores 0.588 to 0.176 (0.220); dropout -0.574 to -0.433 (0.100); student-teacher ratio -0.328 to +0.062 (0.139); local tax rate 0.325 to 0.155 (0.092); social capital 0.641 to 0.299 (0.131); fraction married 0.571 to 0.221 (0.127); single-mother share -0.764 to -0.613 (0.129); fraction Black -0.580 to -0.616 (0.074). The community-level claims weaken in the same way. For mobility in >80%-white ZIP codes against fraction Black, the correlation goes from -0.408 to -0.138. For mobility of children of married parents against the single-mother share, it goes from -0.662 to -0.432 (scripts/community_level_checks.py).
Why this severity. Affects a secondary core finding. The signs of most associations survive, and family structure and race remain the strongest correlates. But for the places where most children live, the associations are about half as large. Three of the six correlates named in the key-findings box (income segregation, local tax rates, marriage rates) are not statistically distinguishable from zero under population weights, nor are two of the three school proxies (test scores, class size) or the Gini.
The authors' response. CHKS (2014a) report the weighted correlations in Online Appendix Table VIII and describe alternative specifications as 'very similar' (p. 1603). The chapter cautions that its correlations are not causal (p. 60) but does not mention weighting.
4moderatelikely · previously known · overclaiming
The chapter stretches its finding back to everyone born in the second half of the 20th century. It relies on older survey studies that measured something slightly different and were too small to detect modest changes. A later study using larger surveys finds that mobility fell sharply between children born around 1950 and those born in the early 1960s, while another finds little change, so the historical claim is unsettled.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. The cited PSID studies have about 50-60 children per cohort and estimate log-log IGEs for 1952-75 births. Davis & Mazumder's larger NLS samples show rank persistence rising by 0.11 (about two cross-CZ SDs of rank-rank slopes) between the 1948-53 and 1961-64 cohorts, concentrated in cohorts the PSID studies omit. Stability over 'the second half of the 20th century' is therefore not established, and the chapter's long-run framing ('the key issue is not that mobility is declining') rests on a contested premise.
Evidence. (1) Lee & Solon (2009, REStat 91(4), p. 771): 'Our estimates are still too imprecise to rule out modest trends in either direction'; cohorts 1952-75, about 58 sons per cohort for 1952-63. (2) Hertz (2007) abstract: 'no evidence of a linear trend in the intergenerational elasticity of family income' for those born 1952-1975. (3) Davis & Mazumder (Chicago Fed WP 2017-05 rev. Jan. 14, 2022, Sec. 4 p. 12; REStat 108(1):1-15, 2026): the rank-rank slope rises from 0.25 (born 1948-53) to 0.36 (born 1961-64). The difference is 0.11 (SE 0.03, 95% CI 0.05-0.16), and the IGE rises from 0.28 to 0.45. They attribute the PSID's stability to its omission of the 1948-51 cohorts and to samples 4-8 times smaller (pp. 24-25). Their 'easily reconciled' remark concerns only the 1971-82 tax-data window (p. 24). (4) Countervailing evidence: Davis & Mazumder (p. 24, fn. 39) report that Jacome, Kuziemko & Naidu (NBER WP 29289, 2021; JPE 133(1):306-354, 2025) find rank-rank trends that 'seem to stabilize beginning with the 1940s cohorts'.
Why this severity. A secondary synthesis sentence; the post-1971 window is unaffected by this issue. The later evidence is split: NLS data show +0.11 between the cohorts born around 1950 and the early 1960s, while occupation-imputed series are broadly stable from the 1940s. The claim is therefore unsettled rather than refuted.
The authors' response. NBER WP 19844 fn. 12 discusses Aaronson & Mazumder (2008) and Justman & Krush (2013) and argues that their methods are biased. No response to Davis & Mazumder was located.
5moderatelikely · previously known · methodology
The headline number (0.34) measures children at about age 30 and parents over five years, which can make family background look a little less important than it is over a lifetime. Other studies suggest the true figure may be somewhat higher, around 0.35 to 0.40. That would mean even less mobility than the chapter reports, not more.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. Short windows produce two biases: life-cycle bias from measuring child income at about age 30, and attenuation from transitory variation in a five-year parent average. Together they bias persistence downward. The authors' own 15-year check (+2.8%), the age gradient in later data, and the PSID evidence (0.33 to 0.28 under tax windows; about 0.40 with long centred averages) bracket the bias at roughly 3-15% of the level. Because the bias raises persistence, it reinforces 'less mobility than appreciated'; the cross-CZ ranking is largely unaffected.
Evidence. (1) Mazumder (Chicago Fed WP 2015-04, pp. 31-33; Research in Labor Economics 43:83-129, 2016): 'the rank-rank slope may be around 0.4 or higher rather than the 0.34 reported by Chetty et al.' Imposing the tax-data windows on the PSID lowers the estimate from 0.33 to 0.28 (-15%). His abstract says rank estimates 'are also downward biased and modestly overstate mobility' but that geographic differences 'are unlikely to be affected'. (2) CHKS (2014a, p. 1582): with 15 years of parent income the slope is 0.350, 2.8% above 0.341. (3) In CDGPY's data the slope at ages 29-30 exceeds the slope at 27 by about 11-19% across cohorts (App. Fig. A.3), confirming that the level depends on age. (4) The adjudicator reproduced 0.3407 from the 100 public bins (R2 0.9956). (5) Mitnik et al. (2015, IGE about 0.50) concerns the IGE, which the chapter does not report.
Why this severity. Plausible understatement of a headline number by roughly 3-15% (about 0.35-0.40 against 0.34). That is a noticeable but not transformative change. It would strengthen, not weaken, the chapter's claim that US mobility is low, and it does not affect the geography or the trend.
The authors' response. CHKS (2014a, pp. 1580-1582 and Online Appendices C and E) show the rank slope stabilising around age 30 and changing little with 15 years of parent income (0.341 to 0.350). They attribute Mazumder's (2005) larger estimates to imputation of parent income. No reply to Mazumder (2016) was located.
6minorconfirmed · newly identified here · arithmetic or transcription
The box says the 8.4% and 9.0% figures describe children's incomes 'by age 28'; in the source they are measured at age 26. The numbers are right but the label is wrong. This matters a little because these chances change with age.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. Both endpoints are age-26 statistics. Bottom-to-top probabilities fall with age (12.2% at 26 vs 8.1% at 29-30 for the SOI 1980 cohort), so the mislabel also invites comparison with the 7.5% national figure (age about 30) and the CZ map (ages 26-32), which are on a different basis.
Evidence. AER P&P p. 145 ('Children's incomes are measured at age 26 ... 8.4 percent in 1971 and 9 percent in 1986') and the Figure 3 title ('... at Age 26 by Birth Cohort'). App. Table 4 cols. 1 and 6: 0.0840423 (SOI, 1971) and 0.090127 (population, 1986), reproduced. The level depends on age: SOI 1980 cohort 12.2% at 26 vs 8.1% at 29-30 (App. Table 4 cols. 1 and 11).
Why this severity. A labelling error in the summary box; the numbers are correct and the main text gives no age.
7minorconfirmed · newly identified here · selective presentation
The 'slight increase from 8.4 to 9.0 percent' compares two different datasets measured in different ways. Within either dataset alone there is no increase: one shows no change and the other a small drop. The difference is within the statistical noise.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. The claimed +0.6 pp is less than half the 1.33 pp level gap between the two samples in overlapping cohorts and is within about one sampling SE of the 1971 estimate. Like-for-like changes are 0.0 pp (SOI 1971-82) and -0.3 pp (population 1980-86).
Evidence. AER P&P App. Table 4 (scripts/reproduce_pathways.py). SOI at age 26: 8.40% (1971) and 8.39% (1982). Population at age 26: 9.33% (1980) and 9.01% (1986). SOI at ages 29-30: 5.95% (1971) and 8.79% (1982), a noisy series. In the overlapping 1980-82 cohorts the SOI level exceeds the population level by 1.33 pp. 1971 is the second-lowest of the 12 SOI values (mean 10.11%, SD 1.25 pp). With about 870 bottom-quintile children, the binomial SE is at least 0.94 pp. Later within-race data for 1978 to 1992 show the probability falling for white children (13.7% to 11.9%) and Hispanic children (9.4% to 8.9%) and flat for Black children (3.0%) (CDGPY Tables A.9-A.11).
Why this severity. The box's 'little change' reading is consistent with like-for-like data for these cohorts; what fails is the word 'increase' and the spliced comparison.
8minorconfirmed · newly identified here · overclaiming
The headline says mobility is 'not declining', but that is true only for one way of measuring it: children's rank compared with their parents' rank. By other common measures it did decline. One example is the chance of earning more than one's parents, which fell from about 61% to 50% for children born between 1971 and 1984. The chapter's body explains this; the headline does not.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. 'Not declining' holds only for the copula (relative mobility). Measures that combine the copula with the widening marginal distributions do decline over these cohorts: the expected-income gap between rich and poor children (source p. 142) and absolute mobility (61.2% to 50.3%, 1971-84). The pre-1980 absolute series holds the 1980-82 copula fixed, so its fall reflects slower, more unequal growth rather than rank mobility.
Evidence. Box (p. 55) vs p. 56 col. 1; AER P&P p. 142. Chetty, Grusky, Hell, Hendren, Manduca & Narang (2017), Science 356(6336):398-406: the share of children earning more than their parents is 61.2% for the 1971 cohort, 50.0% for 1980 and 50.3% for 1984 (archived absmob_fig1.csv, re-downloaded from the Wayback Machine).
Why this severity. A problem with the headline wording. The body defines mobility as rank-based and concedes the widening income gaps, so the content is disclosed. The substantive challenge to the rank-based claim itself is F1. Downgraded from Claude's 'moderate'.
The authors' response. The body text (p. 56) and Figure 3's ladder analogy state that the rungs have grown farther apart.
9minorconfirmed · newly identified here · methodology
The state bars are labelled as the chance that a poor child reaches the top fifth. But they average local rates using all children as weights, not just poor children. Done the correct way, the numbers move only slightly (South Dakota from 12.2% to 11.1%), and none of the chapter's comparisons change.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. Pooling P(top | bottom) within a state needs weights N_c*q_c, not N_c. The difference matters only where the share of bottom-quintile parents varies strongly across a state's CZs, as with South Dakota's reservation CZs. It does not affect national or CZ-level estimates.
Evidence. Adjudicator (scripts/reproduce_pathways.py; identical to Codex). The published method reproduces all 51 bars and their order exactly. Re-weighting by 1980-85 children times P(parent in Q1) (ODT VI) gives: South Dakota 12.19% to 11.12%; North Dakota 18.91% to 19.14%; Wyoming 16.21% to 15.23%; Wisconsin 8.65% to 8.10%. The mean absolute change across the 51 bars is 0.16 pp and the maximum is 1.07 pp; Spearman rank correlation 0.995. Regions: West 9.95% to 9.68%, Northeast 9.19% to 9.27%, Midwest 7.61% to 7.36%, South 6.77% to 6.64%.
Why this severity. The weighting is disclosed, the changes are small (at most 1.1 pp), and no comparison in the text changes; the ND-SD contrast widens. Downgraded from Codex's 'moderate'.
10minorconfirmed · newly identified here · overclaiming
To explain why rising inequality did not reduce mobility, the chapter says that income gains at the very top are not linked to mobility. Across US cities that is roughly right. But the cross-country evidence rests on only 13 countries and cannot rule out a strong link. The chapter also leaves out the authors' own estimate that the broader rise in inequality should have reduced mobility a little, which is what later data suggest happened.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. A 13-country regression with SE 0.27 cannot distinguish 'no association' from an association as large as the Gini's. Cross-CZ correlations are silent on the time-series effect of rising top shares. The source's own Gatsby-style benchmark (+7.5%) is consistent with the later-measured rise and would have flagged that a modest increase in persistence was expected.
Evidence. CHKS (2014a) Table V (p. 1613), 13 countries: the standardized coefficient on the top-1% share is 0.17 (SE 0.27), 95% CI about -0.36 to 0.70, which includes the Gini coefficient's 0.62; with 2005 data (12 countries) it is -0.11 (SE 0.28). AER P&P p. 146 predicts persistence rising 'by only 7.5 percent (from 0.30 to 0.323)' over the 1971-93 cohorts. That is above its own 95% bound of about 5.9% over 22 years, and close to the 8-11% rise later measured (F1). Within the US, the CZ correlation of the top-1% share with upward mobility is -0.19 unweighted and +0.06 population-weighted (QJE Online App. Table VIII), so the metro-area part is supported. See also this project's adjudication of CHKS (2014a), F3, on the 'bottom-99% Gini' construct.
Why this severity. A secondary explanatory claim. Its within-US component is supported, and the chapter does not rest its trend finding on it. The part of Claude's I9 alleging a mis-citation is rejected (see rejected_claims).
11minorconfirmed · newly identified here · internal inconsistency
The summary box leaves out income inequality, which the main text names as a key factor, and includes local tax rates, which the text describes as only modestly related to mobility. It is a small mismatch between the summary and the body.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. The summary omits a correlate with |r| about 0.6 and includes one with r = 0.33 that the text describes as modest. Under population weights both shrink (Gini -0.24, local tax rate 0.16; see F5).
Evidence. Box (p. 55) vs pp. 59-60. Unweighted correlations with absolute upward mobility (709 CZs; reproduced): Gini -0.578, bottom-99% 'Gini' -0.647, middle-class share +0.679, local tax rate +0.325.
Why this severity. An inconsistency between the summary and the body; the body text is correct.
12minorconfirmed · newly identified here · documentation gap
The chapter describes its data as covering all children born in 1980-82, measured around age 30. The local maps and city table actually pool children born in 1980-85 and measured at ages 26-32, and the 'all children' sample covers about 86-94% of them. The trend analysis uses a much smaller tax sample that the chapter does not mention. None of this changes the conclusions.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. Pooling younger cohorts measured at 26-32 raises the national bottom-to-top rate by about 0.26 pp (3.5%) relative to the core sample. Readers are also not told that the trend rests on a small stratified SOI sample, which bears on F2.
Evidence. ODT V col. 7 is headed 'P(Child in Q5 | Parent in Q1), 80-85 Cohort', and the ODT VI notes say '1980-85 birth cohorts'; see also CHKS p. 1596. Aggregating the CZ matrices gives an implied national rate of 7.80% for the 1980-85 pool versus 7.54% for the 1980-82 core sample (reproduced). AER P&P App. Table 1 col. 4: coverage 85.6% (1980), 91.6% (1981), 93.7% (1982). SOI samples have 4,331-9,936 children per cohort (col. 1).
Why this severity. Undisclosed but small effects (about +0.26 pp on the national rate); the figure notes point to the source tables.
The authors' response. CHKS (2014a) disclose the 1980-85 pooling, which improves precision in small CZs.
13minorconfirmed · newly identified here · internal inconsistency
A few small slips. The same measure is given as 34 and as about 30 on the same page because two different datasets were used. A figure note refers to two figures when there is one. One citation has the wrong page range. None affects the conclusions.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. The 34 vs 30 discrepancy (about 12%) mostly reflects one-year vs five-year parent income in the SOI vs population samples, i.e. attenuation. It is not a change over time.
Evidence. QJE population sample, five-year parent income: slope 0.341. SOI-based consolidated series: mean 0.296; SOI 1980-82 cohorts: 0.308 for the same cohorts (AER P&P App. Table 1 col. 5; reproduced). The page image of p. 56 shows a single-panel Figure 1. Crossref lists Piketty & Saez (2003), QJE 118(1), as pp. 1-41, as does the AER P&P reference list.
Why this severity. Presentation only; no conclusion depends on them.
14minorlikely · newly identified here · misrepresentation of source
The chapter says successful children from rural areas typically move to big cities, often in other states. The underlying study shows only that a bare majority (55%) of them live in an urban area at 30, compared with 45% of all rural children. It says nothing about big cities or state lines.
Technical detail and evidence
Why it matters, in detail. A 55% majority, 10.6 pp above the rural baseline, becomes 'typically ... large metropolitan areas ... out of their state'. Neither metro size nor interstate moves is measured in the cited work.
Evidence. CHKS (2014a, p. 1595): 55.2% of rural-raised children who rose from the bottom to the top quintile live in urban CZs at 30, versus 44.6% of all rural-raised children. 'Urban' means any CZ intersecting an MSA. No statistic is given on large metros or on leaving the state of birth, and children are located by where they were claimed as dependents. CHKS's stayers check (Online Appendix robustness row 8; 62% of the sample) finds that high-mobility areas also raise mobility for children who stay. The authors' Vox column contains no such claim; Chetty (2015, Penn Press) was not available to check.
Why this severity. A descriptive overstatement of a side remark; the urban-rural comparison itself reproduces (child-weighted bottom-to-top probability 7.9% urban vs 9.7% rural).
Claims examined and rejected
Problems one auditor raised that did not survive checking.
- Note 3 mis-cites Piketty & Saez (2003) as support for the claim that top-1% shares are not associated with mobility (part of Claude's I9). — Note 3 ends a sentence with two clauses. Piketty & Saez (2003) documents the first ('much of the increase in inequality has come from the extreme upper tail'), exactly as the AER P&P cites it (p. 146). The mobility-association evidence is CHKS (2014a), cited in note 1. Only the page-range slip survives (F14), and the substantive part of I9 is kept as F10.
- North Dakota's top rank reflects the 2011-12 Bakken oil boom, and ND and SD are not socio-demographically similar (report Sec. 6, not counted as an issue by Claude). — Examined. Excluding the six oil-patch CZs (Williston, Dickinson, Minot, Sidney, Lemmon, Bowman) leaves ND at 16.3%, still the highest state (WY 16.2%) and far above SD (12.2%). SD is pulled down by reservation CZs (Gordon 3.2%, Mission 2.4%), which makes 'similar socio-demographic characteristics' loose. It does not affect the point that neighbouring states differ.
- The neighbouring-state contrasts (Texas 8.9% vs Arkansas 7.0%; New Mexico 8.4% vs Arizona 7.2%) are modest rather than 'very different' (report Sec. 6). — A wording judgment. The gaps are 1.2-1.8 pp (17-26% relative; 0.4-0.6 of the 2.9 pp cross-state SD), the values reproduce exactly, and 'very different' is defensible.
- The June 2014 replication-package workbook revises ODT V col. 7 by up to 0.68 pp relative to the January 2014 workbook (report Sec. 6). — Not an error in the chapter. Every Pathways number matches the January 17, 2014 workbook, which is also the file Opportunity Insights currently posts (fresh download, sha256 3c851b8f...). The revision is graded for the QJE paper in this project's adjudication of CHKS (2014a).
- 'No systematic correlation between mobility and local labor market conditions' passes over the strong teenage labour-force-participation correlate (r = 0.63), noted as a caveat by both auditors. — The sentence repeats the QJE's own summary, and the QJE (Online Appendix H; fn. 43) treats teen LFP as reflecting pre-labour-market factors. The conventional labour-market measures are weak (employment rate 0.21, manufacturing -0.26, China shock -0.18 unweighted; 0.02, -0.16 and 0.00 population-weighted).
- The Stata and Excel releases give slightly different local-tax-rate correlations (+0.319 vs +0.325). — Codex did not count it as an issue. The difference is immaterial to the chapter's qualitative statement.
- Mitnik et al.'s (2015) IGE of about 0.50 (optimal-tax-behavior-23) shows the chapter's 0.34 is too low (examined and dismissed by both auditors). — The chapter reports a rank-rank slope, not an IGE, and the two estimands are not comparable. The related attenuation concern for the rank slope is kept as F4.
- The PDF text layer contains axis labels from another chart ('Median Net Worth', '1000s, 2010$') near Figures 1-2 (noted by both auditors). — These are invisible text-layer artefacts; the rendered figures (checked on page images) show the correct axes.
Audit notes
What reproduced. No microdata are public, so nothing could be rebuilt from linked IRS or Census records. Everything that can be computed from the authors' public aggregates was recomputed independently from freshly downloaded files (scripts/run_all.sh). Reproduced exactly or to printed precision: the rank-rank slope (0.3407 vs 0.341) and its linearity; the 7.5% national transition rate; the trend endpoints 8.4%/9.0% and 74.5/69.2 pp; the consolidated series and its -0.0006/yr trend and 0.0008 bound; all 51 Figure 4 bars and their order; the Figure 5 cut points; all 20 Table 1 rows; the 2-3x ratios; the urban-rural contrast; and the unweighted and population-weighted correlates (QJE Online App. Table VIII cols. 1 and 3). Not reproduced as stated: the 'by age 28' label (the source is age 26); the 'slight increase' (like-for-like samples show 0.0 and -0.3 pp); the state bars as conditional probabilities (bottom-quintile weights give SD 11.1%, not 12.2%); and the 'extremely stable' trend once forecasts are dropped or replaced. The measured-only trend is +0.0024/yr (95% CI -0.0026 to +0.0075). With later measured data substituted, it is +0.0020 to +0.0029/yr, with CIs excluding zero. Later evidence was checked directly. CDGPY App. Fig. A.3 values were recovered exactly from the PDF vector paths and validated against the five published SOI points (within 0.0004). The CDGPY national CSV, the 2017 absolute-mobility series and the Opportunity Atlas CZ file were also used.
Limits of this audit. No access to IRS or Census microdata: standard errors, linkage and sample selection could not be re-estimated. CDGPY values come from the Nov. 26, 2025 Opportunity Insights PDF (exact plotted values, validated on the five SOI points) and its public CSV; the typeset QJE version was not compared. The conflict between the AER P&P measured age-26 population slopes (falling over 1980-86) and CDGPY's age-27 slopes (rising) is unresolved, which is why F1 is graded 'likely' rather than 'confirmed'. CDGPY publish no pooled-race bottom-to-top probabilities, so only within-race changes are cited. The 2018 Routledge reprint (Grusky & Hill, pp. 209-214) is paywalled; only its table of contents was seen (publisher preview), so text changes across versions were not checked. Chetty (2015, Penn Press) was not obtained. Mazumder and Davis & Mazumder were read in working-paper versions; Hertz (2007) and Jacome-Kuziemko-Naidu (2025) only via their abstracts and Davis & Mazumder's description. The 1098-T coverage caveat is documented for 1999-2013, and its effect on the 1984-93 gradient trend is unquantified. The cross-country comparisons were checked only against the QJE's Denmark and Canada benchmarks.