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Emmanuel Saez · State of the Union 2018: The Poverty and Inequality Report (Gender), Pathways Magazine, Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, Winter 2018, pp. 20-22

Earnings

10 problems found: 2 moderate · 8 minor

What the paper claims

Every problem found

1moderateconfirmed · newly identified here · internal inconsistency

The chapter says it measures wages plus benefits plus self-employment pay. Its charts actually use a slightly different measure, which subtracts payroll contributions and gives each wife half of her husband's pension and Social Security. On the chapter's own description, women would earn about 55-56 cents per man's dollar instead of 57, and the typical man's earnings would have grown about 10% over 50 years rather than not at all. The main message (a large gap, slow growth for men) is unchanged.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. Pre-tax labor income nets out social-insurance and pension contributions, which rose over time and are larger for men, and adds benefits split equally within couples, which shifts part of husbands' pensions and Social Security to wives. Both narrow the measured gap. The 2014 ratio is 1.757 on the plotted concept vs 1.792 (published factor labor income) or 1.809 (public-file wages + fringes + 70% of mixed income), i.e. 56.9 vs 55.3-55.8 cents. For medians the contribution wedge widens over time (factor vs pre-tax male median: 8.7% in 1964, 14.2% in 2014 in the micro-files). The plotted male median falls 0.3% over 1964-2014; on the stated concept it rises 9-11% (about 0.2%/yr). That is still stagnation, but not 'the same'.

Evidence. Chapter p. 20 (definition, key findings), Figs. 1-2. PSZ (2018) QJE 133(2), Figure VI note p. 591 ('Pretax labor income is factor labor income plus pensions, Social Security, and unemployment insurance benefits, minus the corresponding contributions. Pensions and Social Security benefits are split 50/50 between spouses') and Figure VII note p. 593. Adjudicator digitisation of the chapter's vector Figure 1: RMSE 0.020 against TF1 col [18] (pre-tax, ages 20-64) vs 0.097 against col [14] (factor, 20-64) (scripts/pdf_chart_dump.py, digitise_figures.py). TF1 (Nov 2017) 2014: col [18] 1.7568 (56.9 cents) vs col [14] 1.7920 (55.8 cents). Public DINA micro-file 2014 (Oct-2019 vintage), ages 20-64 incl. zeros: wages + fringes + 70% of mixed income (flemp+flmil) 1.809 (55.3 cents) vs plinc 1.760. Male median in 2014 $ (PSZ national-income deflator), micro-files: stated concept 36,718 (1964) to 40,605 (2014), +10.6%; factor +9.4%; pre-tax +2.8%; published TB13 (pre-tax) 35,796 to 35,700, -0.3% (output/micro_gender_stats.txt, medians_deflated.txt). PSZ2017Programs/build_usdina.do: plpco = -wagpen - oacont - oacont_se; ploco = -dicont - uicont - dicont_se; pensions and benefits halved for married couples; plinc = flinc + plcon + plbel. MainData Data!GT ('Memo: average pre-tax labor income of men 20-64 / women 20-64') feeds Fig. 1, and Data!FW-FY, labelled 'Median factor labor income', equal the pre-tax TB13 medians. Saez's companion slides (May 2018, slide 3) also define 'Earnings = wages earnings + payroll taxes + fringe benefits + self-employment income' while the chart is labelled 'average pre-tax labor income'.

Why this severity. The mislabel changes the headline only modestly (57 cents becomes 55.3-55.8; '75 percent higher' becomes 79-81%, about 5-7% of the premium), and it goes the way of a larger gap, so it does not flatter the thesis. But it is an undisclosed inconsistency in the chapter's central definition, and it turns the secondary claim that the male median was 'the same' in 1964 and 2014 into a rise of about 10%.

The authors' response. No response located. The concept is stated correctly in the notes to PSZ (2018) Figures VI-VII, but not in the chapter.

2moderateconfirmed · newly identified here · overclaiming

The chapter says women had nearly caught up with men in having jobs by the early 1990s. They had not: in 1993 about 75% of men but only 58% of women were in the labor force, and in 2014 the gap was still about 12 points. The chapter confused 'women are almost half of all workers' with 'women are almost as likely as men to work'. These are different because there are more adult women than men. The 57-cent and 16% figures are unaffected.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. The chapter conflates s (women's share of earners) with r_f/r_m (the relative probability of earning). With women about 52% of adults, equal participation would put s near 0.52; the observed s = 0.468 (1993) and 0.4765 (2014) imply r_f/r_m = 0.82-0.84. In the CPS, the 1.17 employment-rate ratio (ages 25-64) accounts for about 29% of the log of the 1.75 comprehensive ratio, so participation is still a material component of C1. For C2 the benchmark barely matters: women's 16.5% share of the top 1% vs 47.65% of all earners (rather than 50%) is an under-representation factor of 2.9 instead of 3.0.

Evidence. Chapter p. 21 and key-findings box p. 20. TF1 col [2] (Nov 2017): 38.0% (1962), 46.2% (1990), 46.8% (1993), max 47.7% (2012), 47.65% (2014). Female population share p = (mean_men - mean_all)/(mean_men - mean_women) from TA5: 0.515 (1962), 0.518 (1993), 0.520 (2014); Census V2016: 51.4% of adults 20+ in 2014. r_f/r_m = [s/(1-s)][(1-p)/p] = 0.578 (1962), 0.818 (1993), 0.839 (2014) (output/claims_check.txt). BLS CPS labor-force participation, 16+, annual means of FRED LNS11300001/LNS11300002: men/women 82.0/37.9 (1962), 75.4/57.9 (1993), 69.2/57.0 (2014) (output/bls_deflator_checks.txt). CPS-ASEC 2014 earner-rate ratio, men/women aged 25-64: 1.17 (output/cps_pinc03_age.txt). PSZ (2018) p. 594: 'women are almost as likely to work as men today ... converged to close to 50% during the 1970s and 1980s: women have closed the participation gap'.

Why this severity. A substantive secondary claim is wrong on every standard measure: a 17-18-point participation gap remained in 1993. It also sits uneasily with the first key finding, which counts participation differences as part of the 57-cent gap. It does not change the C1 or C2 numbers, and the glass-ceiling contrast survives with the correct benchmark.

3minorconfirmed · newly identified here · documentation gap

The chapter suggests its long-run numbers come from tax forms that report each spouse's wages. Such forms were only used from 1999. For earlier years, the split between husbands' and wives' earnings comes mostly from a survey and from estimates for missing years, and the sex of unmarried filers before 1979 was estimated. Testing the plausible range of these estimates shows the historical comparisons barely move, so this is a disclosure problem rather than a reason to doubt the trend.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. The 1960s baselines (3.7x, under 5% at the top) are model-based: CPS shares for 95% of couples plus 1969 tax tabulations carried back for the top 5%. The most fragile number is the 1962 top-0.1% female share: 2.04% (Nov 2017), 2.51% (Oct 2019) and 3.08% (Sep 2020, Feb 2022) in the published tables, and 0.94% in the public micro-file. The quoted changes are robust to about +/-1 point. The override lowers the 1960s female share in top cells; single filers are at most about 3% of the top 0.1%, so it can only slightly raise measured progress. The 1962 ratio is 3.63-3.71 across vintages.

Evidence. Chapter p. 20. PSZ (2018) QJE p. 590 (W-2 'from 1999 onward. Prior to 1999, we rely on IRS tabulations ... top 5% ... and on similar tabulations ... in the CPS for the bottom 95%'). PSZ Data Appendix (Nov 2017) section B.2, p. 21: W-2 'only since 1999 and a few years isolated years before 1999 (namely 1969, 1974, and 1982-6)'; 'Before 1979, we assume that the split of the labor portion of self-employment income is the same as in 1979'. Section A.2: impute.do 'imputes gender of single filers over the period 1962-1978'. PSZ2017Programs/sharefbuild.do: lines 8-9 ('TO DO3: CPS and tax data are not fully consistent for bottom 95% ... creating slight discontinuity in 1998 to 1999'); lines 159-160 ('secondary is always defined as the person with lowest wages so it introduces a bias downward for wives and secondary earnings are capped at 30K'); lines 445-449 (interpolation schedule); lines 581-589 ('excess number of women in 1969 for high wages (relative to 1974, not clear why, probably data issue)', then 1969 top-cell values replaced by 1974 values). TF1 (Nov 2017): pre-tax ratio 1.963 (1998), 2.013 (1999), 1.998 (2000); women's top-10% share 21.3%, 20.1%, 21.2%. Sep 2020: 1.946 to 1.947; Feb 2022: 1.940 to 1.940 (output/vintage_compare.txt). 1962 public file: singles are 7.8%/4.8%/3.1% of the top 10%/1%/0.1%; married women 1.72%/0.85%/0.21% (output/top_composition.txt).

Why this severity. The disclosure gap is real; the 1969 override is not documented even in PSZ's appendix. But its demonstrated effect on the numbers the chapter cites is small. The 2014 levels rest on W-2 data, and the 1999 seam moves the ratio by about 0.05 (2.5%) in one year. Extreme assumptions on single filers' gender bound women's 1962 top-1% share within [0.85%, 5.6%]. Across PSZ's own vintages and files, the 1962-2014 changes stay within +13.1 to +14.1 points (top 1%) and +9.0 to +10.9 points (top 0.1%). Downgraded from Auditor A's 'moderate' for this reason.

The authors' response. PSZ Data Appendix section B.2 states that the interpolation 'delivers results that are close to the results obtained for years when we have exact wage split (1969, 1974, and 1999-2014)'. No response on the 1969 override; the 1999 seam disappears in the Sep-2020 vintage, and PSZUpdates gives no stated reason.

4minorconfirmed · previously known · methodology

Whether business owners' profits count as pay for work or as investment income is a judgment call, and it changes who appears among top earners. Under reasonable alternatives, women's share of the top 1% would be somewhere between about 15% and 18%; later versions of the authors' own data say about 17%. Either way, women remain a small minority at the top.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. Top pass-through income is male-dominated. Reclassifying it as labor raises men's top labor incomes if it is attributed to husbands (lowering women's shares), or raises wives' incomes if it is split like capital (raising them). The attribution rule matters more than the labor share. PSZ's own Sep-2020 revisions moved the 2014 top-0.1% share by +1.3 to +1.6 points. The contested scaling of mixed income for under-reporting (us-income-10) is bounded by the no-mixed-income case (17.8% of the top 1%).

Evidence. Adjudicator re-run (scripts/passthrough_check.py; Oct-2019 2014 file; scorinc is split equally across spouse records in all 21,047 married units). Women's shares of the top 1%/0.1%: baseline 15.88%/11.87%; +75% S-corp split 50/50, 18.03%/15.73%; all to husband, 14.85%/10.47%; by couple's mixed-income split, 16.34%/12.73%. Excluding mixed income entirely: 17.80%/12.18% (output/mixed_income_bound.txt). TF1 2014 by vintage: 16.46/11.49 (Nov 2017), 16.29/11.51 (Oct 2019), 17.30/12.82 (Sep 2020), 17.27/13.12 (Feb 2022). PSZUpdates section 2.2.2 (partnership mixed income 50% capital, sole proprietorships 20% capital); section 2.1.5 (heterogeneous S-corporation shares used for wealth: 'labor income is disregarded when estimating S-corporation wealth'). Feb-2022 build_usdina.do: flinc = flemp + flmil + flprl + flsubl, with flmil = flmil_s + flmil_p (no S-corporation labor component).

Why this severity. Plausible alternative classifications move the top-1% share by about +/-1-2 points and the top-0.1% share by -1.4 to +3.9 points. Women remain a small minority at the top under all of them, so the glass-ceiling conclusion is unaffected.

The authors' response. Saez & Zucman (2020), 'Trends in US Income and Wealth Inequality: Revising After the Revisionists', NBER WP 27921, section 4: about half of pass-through profit is capital income, not a quarter. PSZ Updates (Sep 2020, section 2.2.2) re-split mixed income (partnerships 50/50, sole proprietorships 80/20 labor/capital).

5minorconfirmed · newly identified here · documentation gap

The chapter says young men earn 1.3 times what young women earn and older men almost twice what older women earn. These exact numbers cannot be found in any published table. A government survey shows the same direction (bigger gaps for older workers) but a smaller difference between age groups: about 1.5 for people in their late twenties and early thirties versus 1.8 for people aged 55-64.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. With PSZ's published 20-44 ratio of 1.60 (factor income; 1.54 pre-tax in the micro-file), a 20-34 ratio of 1.3 implies a 35-44 ratio of roughly 1.85-2.0, above the CPS's 1.73. The CPS 55-64 value (1.80) is below 'almost 2'. Concept differences could explain part of the gap: tax data capture top earners (mostly men aged 45-64) better, PSZ count incarcerated adults as zeros, and benefits are split within couples. The magnitudes therefore remain undocumented.

Evidence. PSZ Data Appendix (Nov 2017) Figure S.7 ('Average labor income of all men aged 20-64 / all women aged 20-64, by age group': All, 20 to 44, 45 to 64; 1979-2014). TF1 cols [15]-[16], 2014: 1.599 (20-44), 2.020 (45-64). PSZ codebook: age is 'restricted to three age categories'. CPS-ASEC 2015 PINC-03, 2014 earnings incl. non-earners, men/women mean per person: 1.56 (25-34), 1.73 (35-44), 1.87 (45-54), 1.80 (55-64); PINC-05: 1.36 (15-24) (output/cps_pinc03_age.txt, cps_pinc05_check.txt).

Why this severity. A secondary descriptive claim that is unverifiable rather than shown to be wrong. The qualitative pattern (the gap grows with age through mid-career) is corroborated.

6minorconfirmed · newly identified here · internal inconsistency

In Figure 2, the middle line labelled 'Working-Age Adults' is calculated differently from the lines for men and women. It pools each married couple's earnings and splits them equally, whereas the other lines use each person's own earnings. So the middle line sits higher than it would if calculated like the other two. The text does not rely on it, so this is a presentation flaw.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. Equal splitting averages couples' labor income, which raises the pooled median when wives earn little (1962: 21.6k vs 16.0k individualised; 2014 public file: 32.3k vs 28.1k). Plotting it next to individualised sex-specific medians makes the three lines inconsistent. The undisclosed Dec-2016 to Nov-2017 switch also leaves PSZ's own text inconsistent with its table.

Evidence. Micro-file recomputation in 2014 $ (output/medians_deflated.txt): equal-split pooled median 21,670 (1962), 23,102 (1964), 33,543 (1999) vs TB13 col [7] 21,588 / 23,144 / 33,611. Individualised pooled median 15,952 / 17,349 / 29,066. Dec-2016 TB13 col [7]: 15,556 (1962), 25,071 (1989), 27,600 (2014); Nov 2017: 21,588, 30,138, 31,450; men's and women's columns unchanged. Digitised Fig. 2 middle line: about 21,890 (1962) to 31,560 (2014), matching TB13 col [7] (RMSE about 300). PSZ (2018) p. 594: '$27,500' and '10% higher' than 1989 (Nov-2017 table: +4.4%). MainData Data!FW-FY labelled 'Median factor labor income' although they equal the pre-tax medians.

Why this severity. Presentation only: the text discusses only the men's and women's medians, which are correct. But the plotted pooled line sits about 35% above an individualised pooled median in 1962 and about 12-15% above in 2014.

7minorconfirmed · newly identified here · replication failure

The authors posted simplified data files so others can check their work, but those files do not reproduce the published figures on women's earnings, even for the 1960s, where the authors say they should match exactly. The published figures look right when compared with other sources, but outsiders cannot recompute them. One year (1979) in the published table is also a copy of the previous year.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. Before 1999 the public files give every wife a tabulated share of the couple's self-employment income. This creates millions of tiny 'earners' and leaves very few wives at the top; the published pre-1979 computations evidently differ, contrary to the appendix. Post-1979 public files have about 3m too few working-age men. Outsiders therefore cannot recompute the chapter's series, which rest on confidential data.

Evidence. Adjudicator re-implementation of outsheet_dina.do lines 385-424 (cumul flinc if flinc>0; rank >= .9/.99/.999) on the Oct-2019 public files vs the Oct-2019 TF1. 1962: all earners 40.07% vs 38.01%; top 10% 4.73% vs 5.12%; top 1% 2.50% vs 3.15%; top 0.1% 0.94% vs 2.51%. 1964: 39.63/37.71, 3.53/4.74, 2.60/2.59, 0.92/2.55. 2014: 49.42/47.70, 29.82/27.21, 15.88/16.29, 11.87/11.51 (output/psz_fracfemale_exact.txt). In the 1962 file, 3.53m women (3.25m married) are earners only through mixed income (zero employee compensation; median factor labor income $263 nominal); excluding them gives 37.50% (output/zero_wage_women_1962.txt). PSZ Data Appendix A.3.3: 'Before 1979, there are no internal files so external and internal computations are identical before 1979'. Public 2014 files: ages 20-64 are 51.94% (Oct 2019) and 52.10% (Feb 2022) female vs 50.33% in Census V2016 (output/micro_gender_stats.txt, census_sex_share_2014.txt). TF1 1979 cols [2]-[12] identical to 1978 in the Nov-2017, Oct-2019, Sep-2020 and Feb-2022 tables.

Why this severity. This affects outside verifiability, not the published values. The chapter's numbers come from the internal-data tables, whose 2014 earner share (47.65%) is close to BLS (women were 47.4% of people who worked during 2014: 75.4m of 159.1m, Work Experience of the Population, Table 1). Public-file values differ by at most about 1.5 points at the top and 2 points for the all-earner share.

The authors' response. PSZ codebook (Feb 2022): the external micro-files 'do not exactly reproduce the results published in Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018) that were produced using more comprehensive internal-use tax data'. Nothing addresses the pre-1979 gender statistics.

8minorconfirmed · newly identified here · external inconsistency

The chapter says the traditional pay gap shrank a lot in the 1970s and 1980s. The data it cites show the gap barely moved in the 1970s and shrank in the 1980s. This is a side remark and does not affect the chapter's own findings.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. On the full-time median measure, essentially all of the 1973-1993 narrowing happened after 1979 (gap 37.6% in 1979, 23.9% in 1993); the 1970s change was about 1.5 points. Some adjusted measures do show 1970s gains, so the statement is a common but inaccurate gloss of the series the chapter cites.

Evidence. OECD US gender wage gap, 2017 vintage (via Our World in Data, updated 17 Oct 2017): 38.1% (1973), 39.1 (1974), 37.6 (1975), 37.8 (1976), 38.2 (1977), 39.0 (1978), 37.6 (1979), 36.6 (1980), 28.5 (1990), 23.9 (1993), 18.9 (2015); 100/(1-gap) = 161.6%, 131.4%, 123.3%. Blau & Kahn (NBER WP 21913, section 2): 'After many years with a stable female/male earnings ratio of roughly 60%, women's relative wages began to rise sharply in the 1980s'. Kopczuk, Saez & Song (2010; NBER WP 13345) describe the literature as finding narrowing 'especially during the 1970s and 1980s', and Blau and Beller (1988), as summarised by Blau and Kahn, find 1970s gains on hours- and selection-adjusted measures.

Why this severity. A background statement about the conventional gap; it does not enter any of the chapter's own estimates.

9minorlikely · newly identified here · overclaiming

The chapter implies that counting fringe benefits and self-employment income from tax records is part of why its gap is so much bigger than the usual one. In its own data, fringe benefits actually shrink the gap a little and self-employment widens it a little. The big difference comes from counting people who do not work or work part-time, and from using averages. A standard government survey gives the same 1.75 ratio, so tax data are not needed for this number, though they do matter for the top-earner figures.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. Ratio-of-means decomposition (2014): fringes -0.04 (health premia are close to lump-sum per covered worker), 70% of mixed income +0.085, pre-tax netting -0.05; net about zero. Bridging the CPS (ages 15-64): 1.27 (FTYR median), 1.41 (median, all earners), 1.50 (mean, earners), 1.71 (mean incl. non-earners). The measure's novelty is conceptual (all adults, means), not a different empirical gap that requires tax data.

Evidence. Micro-files (output/micro_gender_stats.txt). 2014 Oct-2019 file: flwag 1.7645, flemp 1.7246, flemp+flmil 1.8090, flinc 1.8074, plinc 1.7598. 1999: 1.928, 1.888, 1.992, 1.991, 1.961. Feb-2022 2014 file: 1.834, 1.791, 1.857, 1.857, 1.792, so 'equal to a wages-only ratio' holds only approximately and is vintage-specific. CPS-ASEC 2015 tables PINC-05 and PINC-03 (output/cps_pinc05_check.txt, cps_pinc03_age.txt): men/women ages 15-64, full-time year-round median 1.27, median among earners 1.41, mean among earners 1.50, mean per person incl. non-earners 1.71; ages 25-64, 1.747. PSZ Data Appendix section B.3.3: fringe benefits imputed from CPS pension coverage, with contributions proportional to wages capped at P99, plus health-plan amounts.

Why this severity. This concerns the explanation of the headline, not its value. The 1.75 is correct and is reproducible from survey data; tax data matter for C2 (top shares), not C1. The chapter's wording is hedged ('might', 'in conjunction'), hence 'minor' and 'likely'.

10minorplausible · newly identified here · overclaiming

The chapter says the gap between the typical man's and the typical woman's earnings shrank mainly because men's earnings stopped growing. By simple arithmetic, most of the shrinking came from women's earnings rising sharply. Men's stagnation is the main story only if you compare with how much men would have earned had they kept pace with the economy, or for the years after 1999. The wording is loose rather than false.

Technical detail and evidence

Why it matters, in detail. Decomposition of the change in ln(M/F). With a zero-growth benchmark, women's median growth explains 86-100% of the narrowing from any start year 1962-1990. With a balanced-growth benchmark (male median growing at per-adult national income, x1.63-2.16), the male shortfall explains 36-38% from 1962/64 and 57-59% from 1969/73. Only 1999-2014 is male-driven under both (about 98-99%).

Evidence. Chapter p. 21. TB13 cols [8]-[9] (Nov 2017). Male share of the narrowing of ln(male/female median): -2.5% (from 1962), 0.1% (1964), 11.9% (1969), 14.4% (1973), 1.1% (1990), 98% (1999). Male share of the narrowing of the dollar gap: 0.5% (1964), 32.0% (1973), 99.1% (1999) (output/claims_check.txt). Counterfactual with the male median growing like per-adult national income (TA0 col [13]): the male shortfall accounts for 36% (from 1962), 38% (1964), 57% (1969) and 59% (1973) of the log narrowing; counterfactual 2014 ratio 3.2-3.45 vs actual 1.68 (output/median_counterfactual.txt).

Why this severity. This is an interpretive sentence about a secondary result. The facts it summarises (male stagnation, a 7.6-fold female rise) are correctly reported in the same paragraph. Under a balanced-growth counterfactual for the window the sentence names, male stagnation explains 57-59% of the narrowing, so the claim is defensible on one reading and wrong on the plain accounting reading. Downgraded from Auditor B's 'moderate'.

Claims examined and rejected

Problems one auditor raised that did not survive checking.

Audit notes

What reproduced. Reproduced exactly from the authors' published tables (PSZ Nov-2017 Appendix Tables II): every number in the chapter, including the 1.7568 ratio (56.9 cents), the 16.46% top-1% share, all 1960s baselines and changes, the medians, and the 108/234-year parity horizons. The three figures were digitised from the PDF's vector paths and match the pre-tax ratio (TF1 col [18]), the TB13 medians and the TF1 female shares. Reproduced closely from the public DINA micro-files (Oct-2019 vintage, the closest released to the chapter's): 2014 ratio 1.760 and top-1% share 15.9%; Feb-2022 file 1.792 and 16.2%. Not reproduced: the published pre-1979 gender statistics from the public files (1962 top 0.1%: 0.94% vs 2.51% in the same-vintage table; F9), and the 20-34/55-64 age ratios (no published source; F7). The post-1979 internal-data values cannot be recomputed outside the IRS. Independent benchmarks agree: CPS-ASEC 2014 ratio 1.747 (ages 25-64); SSA-based top shares (Guvenen-Kaplan-Song) within about 1 point; BLS participation rates (used to test F2). Alternative concepts were computed: the stated earnings definition gives 55.3-55.8 cents and +9-11% male-median growth over 1964-2014 (F1); a SYZZ pass-through reclassification gives a top-1% share of 14.9-18.0% (F4).

Limits of this audit. The chapter's post-1979 values come from confidential internal IRS files (exact W-2 splits, ages, gender) and cannot be recomputed. No micro-files were released for the Nov-2017 vintage the chapter uses, so micro-level checks use the Oct-2019 public files (dated 2019-04-01) and the Feb-2022 2014 file. The pre-1999 CPS-based within-couple splits were not rebuilt, and the effect of the undocumented 1969 single-filer override was bounded, not measured (the 1969/1974 public-use tax files are restricted). No independent historical benchmark for the 1960s mean ratio (3.7) was available without CPS micro-data. The CPS benchmarks exclude fringe benefits and the institutionalised population and cover ages 25-64. The CPI-U-RS could not be downloaded (BLS blocked access), so deflator checks use GDP, PCE and CPI-U indexes. The Blau-Kahn quotation is from the NBER working-paper version (WP 21913), not the JEL text. PSZ's statement that incarcerated adults are included could not be verified directly (PSZ's 2014 adult population, 234.4m, is 2.0m below Census V2016). No published response by the author to these chapter-specific points was located.